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9/11 and the Global Democratic Revolution

by David M. Law

The terrorist attacks that took place on 11 September 2001 have raised serious questions for inter-ethnic, inter-confessional and international relations, not to mention for military strategy. But perhaps the most serious questions brought to the fore by 9/11 relate to the new tensions that have come to characterise the relationship between security and democracy.

For a good decade before 9/11, democratisation was generally perceived as a security-enhancing process in old and new democracies alike. The so-called third wave of democratisation that had started in the mid-1970s with the political openings in Portugal and Spain engulfed entire new constituencies as the communist system fell apart in Europe and Eurasia.[1] According to the United Nations Human Development Report, since 1980 over eighty countries have taken significant steps towards democratisation, and although roughly only half of these are considered by the UNDP to be full democracies, the democratic camp was said to encompass 57% of the world population in 2000, up from 38% fifteen years earlier[2]. Post-9/11, however, this trend may be in trouble. There has been no shortage of signs suggesting that security concerns have been encouraging states to reduce their commitments to the civil liberties and political rights without which democracies cannot function.

In this paper, I will look at the relationship between what happened on 11 September 2001 and the repercussions for democracy worldwide. In particular, I will examine the trends that have been observable in democratic practice in both mature and developing democracies since the tragedy, and the governance issues that have come to the fore in its wake. The focus will be on the following areas of enquiry.

1. To what extent have the demands of the struggle against terrorism led to a weakening of the momentum towards democratisation in states that the United States has sought to bring into its anti-terrorist coalition?

2. To what extent has illiberal practice been introduced into the conduct of mature democratic states in the wake of 9/11?

3. What are the implications for global governance of the way nations are attempting to deal with 9/11 – specifically, what are the implications for the UN and its mandating role for actions undertaken in the defence of international peace and security? An associated issue is the impact of 9/11 on the cooperation patterns that have been built up among the developed democracies, for the most part working together under the aegis of NATO.

The overriding question in all this is whether security is displacing democracy as the dominant determinant of government action post-9/11, and whether the democratisation vector that has driven so much of international politics since the end of the Cold War risks going into reversal as a result.

The final section of the paper offers some ideas for policy development. Before this, however, another question needs to be addressed, namely, whether 9/11 is a security problem that can be dealt with by a series of measures, much like how the wave of plane- and ship-hijackings was dealt with in the 1970s and 1980s, or whether 9/11 heralds a new strategic age, quite different from the one that came before, with quite different implications for security behaviour and security regimes. This is a crucial question that goes to the core of much of the acrimonious debate that has taken place within and between states about what to do about 9/11, and now Iraq.

<u>Security Problem or Paradigm Shift?</u>

Several factors conspired to produce the 9/11 attacks. By and large, these are macro-sociological in nature and unlikely to go away anytime soon.

In many ways, **<u>globalisation</u>** has helped set the stage for the kind of attack that occurred on 9/11. Globalisation has spurred the cross border movement of people, goods and services of all types. While there is a highly positive ratio between a country's degree of openness to international trade, commerce, and its own economic health, that same openness can facilitate the activities of international organised crime and terrorist networks. Globalisation also means that all states and communities increasingly find themselves on the same strategic plane. This means that even the security problems of very small entities can play a very big role in international relations. States of the size of Israel and the occupied territories (or smaller), both of which

have a population of around five million souls, make up almost fifty percent of the world's total. This dimension of globalisation is facilitated by the internet and the emergence of television programs and cable networks as international commodities, and the huge opportunities such means of dissemination engender for making publicity of all kinds for all kinds of causes. Even half a decade ago, before the creation of Al-Djazeera, Osama Bin Laden would have found it immeasurably more difficult to advance his ambition to make his agenda that of the world's 1.2 billion Muslims. It is very difficult to imagine circumstances that would lessen the importance of such trends.

A second major factor driving the events of 9/11 is the **vulnerability of high technology and the states that rely on high technology** to small groups of determined individuals, such as the nineteen who hijacked the planes that did so much damage on 9/11. In this respect, the United States, as one of the most open countries in the world, and its hi-tech leader, finds itself particularly vulnerable. During the Cold War, deterrence, containment and mutually assured destruction protected the US from the USSR, its only serious adversary. Only once, during the Cuban Missile Crisis of more than forty years ago, was the system pushed to the brink. By President Bush's own admission, the American strategic concept of Cold War times can no longer be counted on to deter and contain non-state, terrorist actors of the like of Al-Queda, especially if they are not linkable to a state actor. To evoke President Bush's own comparison, the US, with an annual defence budget of over $350 billion, was not able to counter an offensive strike that was mounted for less than the price of a tank. [3] The effectiveness of Al-Queda's investment is not likely to be lost on either its surviving members or those who would follow its lead. As the ongoing efforts of the Administration to rally a new domestic and international consensus around such notions as homeland security and pre-emptive strike continue, it will take some time and travail to evolve workable strategies to counter the agents of post-modern terrorism.

Third, the world community counts among its some 200 members, a number of **weak, failing or failed states**. Typically these states are challenged because of a lack of self-government, a weak civil society, ethnic strife and sorely underperforming economies. Half of the new states created in Central and Eastern Europe have been involved in inter- and intra-state wars during their first decade of existence. Whether some of the states so affected will ever really recover is uncertain. Other states like Afghanistan, Columbia, Sudan and Iraq are

older constructs destabilised by decades of civil war, foreign occupation or home-grown dictatorship - or a combination of the three. Such states are also threatened by their internal contradictions. As we have seen in the case of Afghanistan, weak, dysfunctional states can act as breeding grounds for terrorist or large-scale transnational criminal activity or both, and provide the perpetrators of such activities with safe havens.

A fourth consideration is the **proliferation of weapons** of all kinds. The *Small Arms Survey* points out that while production has declined since the Cold War, the number of small arms in circulation remains over seven billion, and their accessibility has increased as controls on their sale and export have been relaxed in certain countries and prices have become more "democratic"[4]. Substantially more disconcerting is the proliferation of WMD and the increasing range of missile delivery systems. Existing regimes designed to check WMD proliferation are inadequate. Biological and chemical WMD have been used as recently as 1995 in Japan and the 1980s in Iraq. A number of states have or are thought to have nuclear weapons, in defiance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This includes both authoritarian and totalitarian states such as Iraq and North Korea, and democratic states such as Israel. The likelihood that a state actor will use a WMD or provide a non-state actor with the means to do so is high and rising – such is certainly the perception as the current stand-off between the United States and its allies and Iraq underscores.

There are also several **issues that are particular to the Muslim World**. Cumulatively, they suggest that the circumstances that led Islamists to carry out of the attacks of 9/11 are not likely to disappear anytime soon.

The American NGO Freedom House in its 2002 survey judges over seventy percent of the world's states with almost two-thirds of its population to be free or partly free. The ratings for Muslim countries stand in stark contrast. Only one state (Mali) out of the forty-seven states with Muslim majorities is judged to be free, while a further eighteen are assessed to be non-free, for a cumulated total of only 40%. The rankings in terms of electoral democracies yield a similar pattern. Of the world's 192 countries, Freedom House finds 121 to be electoral democracies but only eleven of these have Muslim majorities. In other words, a Muslim-majority country is three times less likely to have a democratically elected government than one without a Muslim majority.[5] In view of the well-documented correlation between political

extremism and oppressive government, these figures are highly significant.

Associated with the challenge of underdeveloped civil liberties in the Muslim world is the un-equilibrated relationship between state and mosque, believer and mosque, and citizen and state. The modernisation of Islam will come as surely as Catholic and Protestant churches have rethought their teaching and their role in the state with, and since, the Reformation. But modernisation in the Muslim world is likely to travel a long and tortuous road. Pressures for modernisation, as the recently published *Arab Development Report* underlines, are growing and may be about to enter a new phase.[6] Still, even when this process has been significantly engaged, it will likely be beset with all the instabilities and uncertainties that have characterised the transition in post-communist Europe. Time will be needed for the process to ripen to a degree that makes systemic reversal unlikely. This will take at least a generation if the experience of other countries is anything to go by.

Western countries must bear at least some of the responsibility for the fact that democratisation and social modernisation have remained underdeveloped in the Moslem world. Western countries have tended to favour the status quo, preferring to work with established regimes and ruling houses, rather than run the risks associated with a major political opening. Think of France's approach towards Algeria in the first half of the 1990s and of America's approach towards Iran in the 1970s or Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. In these cases, democratisation was sacrificed on the altar of the stability that the status quo was thought to offer. Exceptions to this rule – Saddam Hussein, Qaddafi and Khomeini - have been opposed, albeit unevenly, because of the direct threats that they have posed to Western interests. The need to build alliances against regional renegades like Hussein and to protect oil supplies makes this approach in part understandable, but it too carries its risks.

Why have democratisation and modernisation in the Moslem world been so slow to materialise, lagging only behind Africa among the world's regions? A mono-causal answer would do the question injustice. That being said, the vagaries and injustices of the Arab-Israeli conflict have at least in part been responsible. The conflict has exacted a huge price in terms of human and material losses, absorbing resources that Muslim countries could have otherwise invested in societal development. It has tended to deflect attention from the need for meaningful reform in Muslim countries, creating a bond between

political elites and populations that might have otherwise not existed and facilitating the former's efforts to maintain the status quo. The conflict has led to the challenges of modernisation being subordinated to questions of identity - and it has stood in the way of the Muslim world's taking its rightful place both regionally and in the wider world. In time this will change, if and as equitable power-sharing arrangements are found in the Middle East. But this region's ethno-religious strife is proving to be a substantially tougher nut to crack than that of Sri Lanka' s, Spain's, or Northern Ireland's.

To return to a point made earlier, America's real or perceived responsibility for the perpetuation of circumstances in the Middle East that grate on the Muslim world as a whole cannot in any way justify 9/11, but it does in part explain it. All the factors cited above as setting the stage for 9/11 are relevant to any developed state that Al-Qaeda and similarly-minded organisations might blast as an infidel enemy. But America's special relationship with Israel makes it a particularly attractive target for Islamist terrorist action. The latter's objective is not to conquer the USA; it is to overthrow the regimes in the Arab and Muslim world that oppose their agenda. For déclassé elements such as Bin Laden – those who do not accept the regimes in place and/or those are not accepted by them (and who may find themselves in temporary "exile", in Western Europe or North America as a result) – attacking America and other western states may be both the easiest and the most convincing way of profiling themselves as the successor elite in their own countries. Without a democratic revolution in the Muslim world, this is a bomb that will be difficult to defuse any time soon.

9/11 and its Impact on Democracy Worldwide

Historians will write about the impact of 9/11 on governance and intergovernmental relations decades hence, and it will only be with the benefit of hindsight that it will be possible to take this event's full measure. Still, a number of developments have occurred during the period since the attack that could well point to longer-term trends in the making.

The "Axis of Opportunism"

In the aftermath of 9/11, several states found new opportunities to pursue domestic agendas that were at odds with respect for

fundamental political rights and civil liberties, at least on part of their territory.

In **Central Asia**, the United States moved quickly to establish tactical alliances with regional states with a view to securing airbases and overflight rights that would support its campaign against the Taliban and Al-Queda in Afghanistan. The result of this effort can be summarized in five points:

First, the establishment of a US foothold in all five Central Asian states, and particularly in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where between 150 and 2000 troops assigned to Operation Enduring Freedom ended up being stationed.

Second, the not unconnected pouring of US resources into the region, the two most important recipients being the militarily most important supporters of the US presence, namely Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, who received US$160 and $50 million respectively in 2002.

Third, the potential geopolitical reorientation of the region; this may prove only temporary, but many had deemed it out of the question even as the first initiatives in this direction took shape.

Fourth, despite all this, the enhanced US presence has not been accompanied by any discernible improvement in respect for political rights and civil liberties in the region, as many had hoped might happen with the introduction of the US and allied presence here. The trend prior to 9/11 had tended to be negative in both respects throughout the region. Post 9/11, there was no discernible change for the better in Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, while the situation in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, the two key US bridgeheads in the regions, deteriorated.

Fifth, there has also been some evidence that US Administration has been turning a blind eye to the situation on the ground and that human rights activists have come to feel isolated as result. For example, America-based NGO Human Rights Watch has accused the US of certifying "substantial and continuing progress" in meeting agreements laid out in a 2002 bilateral agreement with Uzbekistan although the actual situation on the ground did not warrant it.[7]

The closer relations that the US and **Pakistan** have entertained since 9/11 show a similar pattern. Since 2001, the U.S. Congress has voted for more than $640 million in emergency economic support for

Pakistan, as well as military aid and law enforcement and anti-crime assistance. The enhanced US presence in the country has not in any way been accompanied by an easing of authoritarian rule. Since the aid decisions were taken, President Musharraf has unilaterally imposed constitutional amendments strengthening the role of the military in the government and extending his presidential term by five years, as well as maintaining restrictions on political meetings and rallies imposed after the 1999 coup that brought him to power.[8]

As for **Russia**, which has suffered a number of major terrorist attacks in recent years, Mr Putin's Government has been very supportive of the US Administration's post-9/11 stance. Moscow has responded affirmatively to President Bush's call for an international coalition to eradicate terrorism and at times has appeared closer to Washington than some European capitals have been on the overall approach to be taken. But however the Russian leadership feels about 9/11, there can be little doubt that the American preoccupation with terrorism has encouraged Moscow to pursue its dead-end strategy of the past years towards the situation in Chechnya. Moscow has felt strengthened in its view that its operations in Chechnya are solely anti-terrorist in nature. But the negotiating track that will eventually have to be put in place remains just as resolutely rejected as before. The claims of Russian military spokesman that the Chechen resistance is wholly funded by Al–Qaeda, and largely manned by its fighters have met little challenge in the international community, although scant evidence has been put forward in substantiation. Russia has also felt emboldened in its approach towards Georgia, where it has long argued that the government in Tbilisi is either incapable of taking action against Chechens operating out of the Pankisi Gorge or unwilling to do so. The US has, however, responded to Moscow's threats to intervene in the area with political and material support for Georgia.[9]

In **China**, the period after 9/11 has brought an increase in human rights violations. Academics have continued to be arrested, newspapers closed and access to Internet sites controlled – but more energetically than before. The *Strike Hard* campaign designed to circumvent safeguards for criminal suspects, alleged separatists and those accused of religious extremism has gone into higher gear. The campaign against Falun Gong has been intensified. Concern with global terrorism has been used by Chinese officials to justify crackdowns in Tibet and Xinjiang. New anti-terrorism laws have been introduced in Hong Kong that define a terrorist act as one involving the use of threat of force to influence a government, a definition that is vague enough to spell potential trouble for Falun Gong. Moreover, Hong Kong's Chief

Executive has been given the authority to freeze the assets of anyone he considers to be a terrorist.[10]

Israel is also part of this axis of opportunism although its situation differs from the other countries in this brief survey by the fact that it is the lone long-established democracy in the group and arguably the only nation facing a fully-fledged threat to its existence. Analysis of the situation in Israel and in the territories controlled by Israel post 9/11 is as yet inconclusive, so much so that it is sometimes difficult to judge the extent to which a trend represented only the continuation of developments after the beginning of the second Intifada in September 2000 or a new departure after the September 2001 attacks on the United States. Nonetheless, the following broad lines would seem to characterise circumstances in the area.

Following 9/11, violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories picked up considerably. Palestinian groups appear to have felt emboldened in their efforts to oppose the Israeli occupation and encouraged to resort to ever more indiscriminate violence against civilians both in the territories and in Israel proper. The Sharon government seems to have believed that the US focus on the campaign against terrorism has given it additional leeway to focus on security matters and to shift the attention away from the issues that have fed conflict in the Middle East and the need for an equitable settlement. The result has been a disaster for both Israeli and Palestinians alike. Causalities have soared on both sides, although they remain roughly three times higher for the Palestinians. The economy in both Israel and the Occupied Territories has taken serious knocks. The ability of either side to negotiate with the other has been severely compromised. Sharon has proven himself to be anything but "a man of peace" as he has systemically tried to dismantle any vestiges of governing authority on the Palestinian side. Arafat's credibility as the leader who can deliver Palestinian support for a historic compromise with Israel - under existing conditions - has been all but destroyed, as he has shown himself incapable or unwilling to rein in suicide bombings, and as he has been discredited in the United States as the "man of terror" in contradistinction to Sharon Democracy and the prospects for further democratization in the region have doubtlessly deteriorated post-9/11. [11]

From this brief and incomplete survey of the behaviour of only a limited number of countries, a few common elements emerge with respect to their capacity – real and evolving - to act as democratic polities. One is that the situation after 9/11 has reinforced already existing anti-democratic tendencies in a series of key countries.

Another is that US dependency on the political and/or military support of these countries has been accompanied by a marked reluctance by Washington to push for a democratisation agenda. A final consideration is that the overall security situation in those countries that have curtailed democratic practice in an effort to contend with terrorism has not necessarily improved.

Civil Illiberties[12]

Additional causalities of 9/11 have been civil liberties in the United States and a number of its Western allies, as restrictions have been put in place in the name of the anti-terrorist campaign. In the United States, where not surprisingly the restrictions have been the most frequent and far-reaching, criticisms of civil libertarians have focussed on three main kinds of activity.

One concerns government **attempts to bend the law or circumvent it** altogether. Examples of this are the government's contention that those being detained for terrorist activity as "enemy combatants" can be denied access to a lawyer and detained indefinitely without trial, and the fact that even American citizens can be designated as such by the US President. A similar tack has been for the government to bypass extradition procedures when transferring suspected terrorists from one country to another, say, from Indonesia to Egypt where interrogation procedures could be used that would be illegal in the United States. Concerns have also been raised by the Administration's reluctance to consider the accused terrorists being held at Guantanamo Bay as prisoners of war under the Geneva Convention and by President Bush – the ultimate decision-maker in any appeal – having and using the authority to assign military commissions the responsibility of trying suspected terrorists.

A second general area of criticism concerns **the secrecy surrounding many government measures**. The Cato Institute, a conservative Washington think tank, has accused the Administration of "supporting measures antithetical to freedom, such as secretive subpoenas, secretive arrests, secretive trails and secretive deportations". Human Rights Watch reported in September 2002 that some 1200 non-citizens had been secretly arrested and incarcerated in conjunction with 9/11 investigations, roughly 800 of which were freed only after the Department of Justice had deemed that they were innocent of any links to terrorism. The presumption of innocence until otherwise proven is a central principle of US law, but it appears that the secrecy

surrounding the arrests and detention has discouraged any substantial public debate of this practice.

The **indiscriminate collection of information** is a third area of concern. Despite denials of racial profiling, the authorities have been accused of targeting Arab and Muslim Americans indiscriminately through such programs as the FBI's random interviewing of 5000 people of Arab descent. The Administration has also been eager to launch a program called TIPS or the Terrorism Information and Prevention System which will encourage Americans to spy on one another and send any suspicious findings to a central database. By virtue of a new law, police have been given much greater powers to demand information about people's employment, educational, and medical records, as well as their reading preferences at libraries and bookstores.

Similar measures have been adopted by America's closest allies in the wake of 9/11. Canada has passed laws increasing surveillance of the internet, electronic mail and telephone conversations, and requiring people leaving the country to provide all manner of travel information, to be stored up to six years. Most EU member governments have taken advantage of security concerns post-9/11 to beef up immigration procedures and take a harder line against asylum – seekers, although they do not always appear to have been motivated by security considerations. France and Germany have enacted laws to give the state greater capacity to monitor their citizen's telecommunications traffic. A similar initiative in Great Britain was watered down when it was greeted with a public outcry The British government has also had to rethink its anti-terrorism act, found to be in breach of human rights law owing to the powers given to the Home Secretary to detain indefinitely foreigners suspected of terrorism. By virtue of a European Union anti-terrorism initiative, police in one country can now arrest people in another for thirty-two crimes, most of them unrelated to terrorism.

These approaches appear to be motivated by many factors. The Americans want to keep those accused of terrorist crimes away from the civil trial process - and the controversy and surprises that it might engender prevent communications between the accused and the outside world, maximise intelligence findings during the extended period of custody for suspected terrorists, and so on. But opportunism has also been at work in the United States and other Western countries as bureaucracies and governments have sought to take advantage of the objective need to rethink their anti-terrorism policies

and the public's preparedness to support new measures and tougher implementation of old ones. Thus far, nothing has happened on ths scale of the internment of 110000 Japanese-Americans in World War Two or the witch-hunt against communists at the beginning of the Cold War. Still, a pattern has been put in place that could – especially if future terrorist plots are not effectively caught in the bud – end up undermining many of the civil liberties that underpin democratic systems of government

Global Ungovernance

The multilateral campaign to hunt down Al-Queda in Afghanistan and overturn its Taliban supporters has in its first year been largely successful. Both groups appear to have been neutralised, although pockets of resistance remain. A regime change has occurred in Afghanistan and the Karzai government, notwithstanding the rebellious activity of warlords in certain parts of the country, appears to have a reasonable chance of continuing to consolidate its position and of bringing adequate government to the country, even if it may not act in line with mainstream democratic norms anytime soon. And despite concerns about the size mass and tenacity of the commitment of international donors, Afghanistan is the subject of a massive foreign reconstruction effort that seems bound to have a favourable impact.

Such successes cannot conceal, however, the new challenges that terrorism of the 9/11 variety have thrown up for the international regimes that have underpinned the global democratic revolution. This is particularly the case for NATO and the United Nations, two institutions that have played a particularly important role in supporting the democratisation process. NATO's role in bringing a successful and peaceful end to the Cold War was indispensable. It was the only security institution capable of checking the ethnic strife in the Balkans that threatened to capsise the new Europe of the 1990s. Its policies of outreach and institutional enlargement to associate the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union with Western security practice have been crucial to the wave of democratisation that engulfed this area in the first decade after the Cold War. As such, NATO has helped secure that vital core of stability and security on which global peace has depended. While not equipped to play a military role, the UN has led international efforts to prevent conflicts from happening and to rebuild societies once the fighting is over. The UN has also acted as the indispensable pillar of the global democratic revolution, championing the cause of democratisation

worldwide and working through its agencies to provide support to democratising and re-democratising countries.

Both institutions have, however, come under pressure as a result of developments in Afghanistan and Iraq. For NATO, the military campaign in Afghanistan has raised serious issues. Notwithstanding the very important role played by individual allies in the Afghan campaign, NATO as an institution has not been able to play any part in the military effort in Afghanistan. Certain developments suggest that this should have been otherwise. Although the Alliance has a long history of difficulty in responding to out-of-area conflicts, developments in the 1990s demonstrated that it could rise to challenges outside the treaty zone if circumstances so demanded. Moreover, the Alliance's new Strategic Concept agreed upon in 1999 gave a green light for out-of–area contingencies when it underscored the importance of threats to member countries emanating from well outside the treaty area.[13] Nor did the Alliance hesitate to evoke the collective defence clause of Article V of the Washington Treaty in the early days after the 9/11 attacks. Despite all this, the US ended up working only bilaterally with the Allied countries that deployed to Afghanistan, outside the Alliance's consultative framework.

There are three possible reasons for this. One is that US military action in Afghanistan comes under the responsibility of the American's Central Command, which has no operational links with NATO. Another is that Washington was determined to avoid a multilateral decisionmaking environment after the difficulties experienced in the Kosovo campaign when bombing targets had to be approved by all 19 of NATO's member countries. A third was that because of the differentials in military capability between the US and other NATO members, a joint military effort at 19 did not make much sense to the Pentagon. Probably, all three factors have played a role here. The bottom line, however, has been that NATO has not been effective in responding collectively to the paradigm shift in the strategic environment brought about by 9/11.

The crisis with Iraq has revealed even larger crevices in Allied solidarity. The four most powerful NATO Allies have been divided into two camps on how to proceed, with the US and the UK favouring action against Iraq, if at all possible with a UN mandate but if necessary without one, and France and Germany, expressing serious reservations about any non-mandated action. The Schroeder Government went even further in the fall 2002 election campaign with its assertion that even with a UN mandate, it would not support a

military action against Iraq. US-German relations have reached lows unparalleled in more than half a century as a result. Things may be patched over in time but the damage done to the privileged relationship that has always been the motor of alliance consultations may have been irreparably damaged.

Disagreement among key state actors has also been on display at the UN. In dealing with the crisis in Afghanistan, the UN Security Council was successful in passing a resolution mandating both the US-Canadian bilateral intervention and the multilateral effort under the umbrella of the ISAF. Handling the follow-on crisis in Iraq has proven to be a different matter. The veto-brandishing Permanent Five members of the United Nations Security Council are divided on how to proceed, with the US and the UK again finding themselves on one side of the argument and France, Russia and the People's Republic of China on the other.

This is not the first time that serious differences of opinion about how to respond to a threat to international peace and security have surfaced in the Security Council. In the Kosovo crisis of 1999, it proved impossible to reach agreement on a mandate for military action against the former Yugoslavia and the NATO-led campaign had to proceed without official UN sanction. [14] The United Nations survived this episode but the controversy over how to proceed with Iraq is potentially much more serious, in three respects.

First, the Bush Administration has made it clear that the global organisation's credibility is on the line: either it supports US action against Iraq, or the US will proceed without a mandate and draw its own conclusions about the UN's viability. A second consideration is that the stakes involved in dealing with Iraq are extremely high. How the international community proceeds will set the stage for the struggle against terrorism for some time to come. How one assesses post-modern terrorism, whether a pre-emptive strike is legitimate against a country supporting terrorism, and under what conditions – these are just some of the questions that will be given an answer as the campaign against Iraq proceeds. The third issue concerns the way the UN takes its decisions, in particular, the role of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council. Again, this is not a new problem. But it has in the present crisis been subject to more scrutiny than on previous occasions. There is growing disenchantment with the system in place, especially when it appears apparent that votes at the Security Council are often not cast in defence of the UN charter but rather to defend narrow national interest.

Indeed, there are a number of questions for which it is hard to find convincing answers. What justification can there be for the P5 having veto powers, other than their victories in World War Two and their nuclear status? Should any smaller group of countries wield such power over the international community? And what system could one reasonably hope to put in its place?

Conclusions

The basic arguments advanced in this paper can be recapitulated as follows. The attacks of 9/11 have brought about a paradigm shift in the security environment that we were accustomed to during a half century of Cold War and a decade of post-Cold War. This shift has placed significant strains on the global democratic revolution, a revolution that had seen an increasing number of states embrace electoral democracy, and a smaller but still significant number move to expand civil liberties and political rights of all kinds. The need for the United States and its allies to establish tactical alliances with democratising states has not resulted in an expansion of democratic practice in these countries; if anything, the reverse has been the case. To respond to the new threat environment, the United States and other developed democracies have felt it necessary to pass new laws and to strengthen application of existing laws. In the process, governments and their bureaucracies have on occasion rolled back civil liberties and political freedoms. Finally, 9/11 has exposed serious fault lines in the institutions that states use to deal with international security, institutions that have at the same time spearheaded democratisation and the global democratic revolution.

At stake here are the prospects for a continuation of the third wave of democratisation, now about to enter its fourth decade. If it is to continue, three main areas of reform must be pursued.

First, the Arab and Muslim worlds need to be brought firmly into the international community of democratising and democratic states. The Arab and Muslim worlds constitute one of the two large international regions - Africa is the other- where democracy remains a marginal phenomenon. A lack of democracy correlates positively with high levels of domestic repression and a propensity to generate terrorism. It also correlates with low economic development, a phenomenon that some Arab states have managed to escape thus far because of their oil reserves, although even Saudi Arabia, the home of most of the 9/11

terrorists - has had to cut back on its social spending in recent years as oil revenues have fallen. Democratisation in the Muslim world needs to be supported by programs that tie financial and other kinds of assistance to respect for human rights and political liberties. Democratisation is furthermore conditioned on a fair settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Both communities need to live in security and believe that, as they do, they enjoy equal rights.

A second major area of reform concerns the need to enhance the performance of the developed democracies. Across the Western world, participation in elections is down, enrolment in political parties has been in decline, and party-financing scandals have been in the ascendancy. Public confidence in the representativeness of elected officials is at an all–time low. The most important lobby – the electorate – perceives itself as receiving short-shrift in the frenzied activity of special interests to endear themselves to the executive and the legislative branches in an effort to secure favour and advantage. This is a serious disadvantage for the campaign against terrorism. People and their leaders need to feel that action against terrorism is being propelled by the widest possible public interest, not by the parochial reflexes of the oil industry, ethnic interests or the military–industrial complex.[15]

Democratic renewal is also about enhancing competence. The strategic shift brought about by 9/11 was not anticipated by the United States Government or for that matter by any other government that has since become significantly involved in the question of how to address the fall–out from 9/11. This constitutes the third major failure to understand what is strategically at work in the world in less than a generation, the other two being the failure to anticipate the fall of the Berlin Wall and the failure to see that the end of Soviet communism would also mean the end of the Soviet Union.

The third area for reform concerns the way the international community deliberates and decides on how to deal with challenges to international peace and security. The UN needs to democratise its decisionmaking procedures. This is a very tall order. None of the P5 states wants to relinquish its veto. There is no consensus in the General Assembly on alternative arrangements. And there is very legitimate concern about how an empowered General Assembly would deal with any expanded responsibilities, the plight of the UN Committee on Human Rights, where anti-democratic states hold the majority, being a case in point. NATO likewise needs to develop the doctrinal, operational and political protocols that the post 9/11 world

requires. A NATO that fails to do so will be judged marginal and ultimately incapable of continuing to support the security and stability that democracies need to thrive and survive.

The main lesson to be won from our experience thus far from the campaign against the post-modern terror of 9/11 is threefold. There must be more democratisation, not less, if the threat of terror is to be contained and significantly reduced. Democracy in the developed world needs to generate more competent decisionmaking, especially in the area of international relations, and to inspire greater confidence at home and abroad about the motivations of its political classes. Finally, the regional and global institutions like NATO and the UN that have played such an important role in supporting democratisation require serious reform if they are to continue to do so. These are daunting challenges that must be met if the third wave of democratisation, unlike those which preceded it, is to avoid going into reversal.

[1] The expression is from Samuel Huntingdon's, *The Third Wave: democratization in the late Twentieth Century* (1991). For a tabular representation of Huntingdon's three waves, see Steve Muhllberger's "Chronology of modern Democracy", available at http://www.nipissingu.ca/department/history/muhlberger/histdem/huntingd.htm.

[2] UNDP Human Development Report 2002, available at www.undp.org/hdr2002/facts.html.

[3] See "The National Security Policy of the United States, available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/ .

[4] See *Small Arms Survey 2002*, available at www.smallarmssurvey.org . The expression "small arms " may be misleading as these are defined as anything that can be man-carried, i.e. including the highly destructive shoulder–borne stinger anti-aircraft guns that were so effective against Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

[5] "New study Details Islamic World's Democracy Deficit", Freedom House, available at www.freedomhouse.org/media/pressrel/121801.htm.

[6] "Self-doomed to failure", Economist, 6 July 2001.

[7] "Is the Human Rights Situation in Eurasia Worse since 11 September? ", Catherine A. Fitzpatrick, Radio Free Europe – Radio Liberty, 11 September 2001, volume 3, Number 37, available at www.rferl.org/specials/9-11 and *Report 2002* of the International Helsinki Foundation on these countries available at www.ihr-hr.org/index .

[8] See the reports by Human Rights Watch on the situation in Pakistan at www.hrw.org/asia/pakistan.psp

[9] "Is the Human Rights Situation in Eurasia Worse since 11 September? ", Fitzpatrick,

[10] See the reports by Human Rights Watch on the situation in China at www.hrw.org/asia/china.psp .

[11] For background on Israel and the occupied territories, see the reports by Human Rights Watch at www.hrw.org, the International Helsinki Foundation, at www.ihr-hr.org/index and the US State Department at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/hr/c1470.htm.

[12] This section relies on three reports: "For whom the Liberty Bell tolls", *Economist*, online edition, 29 August 2002; Robert Mc Mahon, "Crackdown Provokes Debate over Civil Liberties", available at www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/09/02092002153406.asp ; Leonard Sussman, editor, *Press Freedom Survey 2002*, available at www.freedomhouse.org .

[13] "The Alliance Strategic Concept", available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm.

[14] For background on the mandate issue, see my "With the UN whenever possible; without when necessary?" in D. Haglund, editor, New NATO, New Century: Canada, the United States, and the future of the Atlantic Alliance (Queen's Centre for International Relations, Kingston, 2000).

[15] For more on the democratic deficits of developed c democracies, see my "Democratic Deficits, North America and Security", CONNECTIONS Journal, Issue 1, August 2001, PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Garmisch-Patenkirchen, Germany, in cooperation with the Moscow State University Press available at www.pfpconsortium.org .